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Abstract
We observed few important facts that concerns with the new proposal of knapsack cipher 0/255, recently published by Pham [1].
The author claimed that the time complexity for solving new improved trapdoor knapsack is O(256N). In this paper, we show that
the knapsack cipher 0/255 can be solved in the same time that is required for solving the basic knapsack-cipher proposed by Merkle
and Hellman [2]. In other words we claim that the improved version proposed by Pham [1] is technically same as the basic Merkle
and Hellman Knapsack-based cryptosystem.
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1. Introduction
The trapdoor knapsack used for hiding information and sig-
nature is a knapsack-based cryptosystem, first proposed by
Merkle and Hellman [2] in 1978. This public key encryption
proposal has been thoroughly investigated owing to a high com-
putational efficiency (at that time). The motivation of its design
is converting superincreasing knapsack sequence into a com-
putationally hard sequence. Though, the basic version was bro-
ken by Shamir in 1984 [3]. Despite of failure of previous all
knapsack Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC), two new knapsack
PKC proposed by Wang et al [4] and Murakami et al [5] in 2007
and 2008, respectively. However, very recently both has been
broken by peng at al [6] by mounting lattice-based attack.
Shor [7] showed that, the security of most PKC proposed so
far depends on the difficulty of integer factorization problem or
discrete logarithm problem. However, these problems can be
easily solved using quantum computers. Knapsack problem is
one that cannot be easily solved using quantum computers.
Now a days there is requirement of light weight, high-speed
and highly secure cryptography algorithms for electronic com-
merce [8]. So, recently an improvement to the basic knapsack
cryptosystem is proposed in the captioned paper “The improve-
ment of the knapsack cipher” by Pham[1]. However, during
the critical analysis of [1], it was observed that even though the
author claimed the time complexity to be O(256N) for solving
trapdoor knapsack 0/255, we show that the exhaustive search
will take the same time that is required by the basic trapdoor
knapsack proposed by Merkle and Hellman [2]. To the best of
our knowledge, this the first paper, that presenting analytical
observation on knapsack cipher 0/255.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the
Sect. 2 knapsack cipher 0/255 is described, comments on the
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knapsack cipher 0/255 is given in Sect. 3 followed by conclu-
sion in Sec. 4.
2. Description of the Knapsack cipher 0/255
In any PKC system, public key is publicized by the designer
(e.g. by Alice), so that using public key sender (e.g. Bob)
encrypts the plaintext and sends it over a (insecure) com-
munication channel. Upon receiving the encrypted message
(ciphertext b), the receiver (Alice) decrypts the ciphertext b
using her own private key ( A key that is used by the designer
to generate the public key). In the case of Merkle-Hellman
knapsack-based PKC, the trapdoor knapsack A = a1, a2, ..., an
(set of natural numbers) is publicized as the public key (A
typical value of n is 100 and a typical size of each ai is
200 bits). Let, the sender have a message of length n as a
bit string or simply X = x1, x2, ..., xn {xi ∈ 0, 1}. The sender
first compute the sum b and then sends it via the public channel.
where: b = ∑ni=1 ai ∗ xi
Both the receiver and the potential eavesdropper knows the
public encryption vector A and the ciphertext b. Their task is to
find which subsets of the ai sums up to b. This is an instance
of the knapsack problem, which is known to be nondeterminis-
tic polynomial time complete (NP-Complete). This problem is
difficult for the eavesdropper but easy for the receiver because
she have the private key (A′ ,w′ and mod m) i.e. easy knapsack,
inverse of multiplier and modular m respectively.
To achieve a compromise between speed and security, the
vector A of size n can be cut to a small size by a factor of
1/ f (i.e. N = n ∗ (1/ f )) without changing the size of X ( i.e.
n). Since the size of A is reduced but the size of X remains
unchanged, we must allow each xi to take on values from the
set {0,1,2,..., 2 f -1}. These modifications are possible if the
designer performs the following steps.
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1. The designer chooses a superincreasing vector A′ =
(a′1, a
′
2, ..., a
′
N). Let, N = n ∗ (1/ f )
2. Select a modular m > ∑Ni=1 a
′
i.
3. Choose a multiplier w in between 1 and m-1 so that (w, m)
must be co-prime.
4. Generate a vector A of size N as a1, a2, ..., aN (here, ai =
w ∗ a
′
i mod m).
5. Publicize the vector A.
It is clear from the above steps that the result of modifica-
tion is a reduction in the volume of transmitted data without
changing the size of vector X. As a result, the time required for
transmitting data is reduced by a factor of 1/f. However, an im-
portant fact is that the complexity of solving trapdoor knapsack
A is remains unchanged by allowing the above modification.
If the size of vector X is 96 and f=8 then N=96/8=12, that
allows each xi to take on values from the set {0,1,2,..., 255}.
Actually, the knapsack cipher 0/255 is (A′) and the trapdoor
knapsack is (A) in the captioned paper “The improvement of
the knapsack cipher” proposed by Pham [1].
3. Comments on the Knapsack Cipher 0/255
It is noteworthy that the knapsack problem is more general.
In fact, the knapsack-based cryptosystem is a specific instance
of the knapsack problem that is called integer partitioning prob-
lem.
During critical analysis of Merkle and Hellman paper[2], we
observed an important fact in section V (Compressing the Pub-
lic File). n=100 is the bottom end of the usable range for secure
system. But, to maintain a balance between speed and security,
the vector X must be 100 bits long while n can be reduced to
say 20 ( N=20). As a result, the transmitted data is reduced
by a factor of five (100/20). That is possible by allowing each
element xi to take on values in the set {0, 1, 2,...,31} instead
of {0,1}. However, the original equation 1 must be modified to
equation 2.
a
′
i >
i−1∑
j=1
a
′
j (1)
a
′
i > 31 ∗
i−1∑
j=1
a
′
j (2)
Example :
Transmitting 20 Kbits on a low-speed 300 bit/sec takes more
than a minute. But if the transmitted data is reduced by a factor
of 8 to about 2.5 Kbits. Then, the transmission process will
takes less than 8 seconds. This is accomplished by reducing the
number of ai to 12 elements 1. Since the size of vector X is 96,
then for each element ai, we must reserve 8 bits in vector X i.e.
each xi to take any values in 0 to 255 (28 − 1) .
1If the reductions in number of ai is represented by N and the size of vector
X is 96. then N=96/8=12.
3.1. Time Complexity for solving trapdoor knapsack in the
worst case
Let n is the length of vector X.
Case-I: If the length of publicized vector A keep same as the
length of the vector X {xi ∈ 0, 1}, then trapdoor knapsack A can
be solved in time O(2n).
e.g. Let, length(X)=length(A)=96 and xi ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the
time required for searching solution exhaustively=O(296).
Case-II: If the length of publicized vector A is reduced as
(1/f)*length(X), then xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 2 f − 1}. As a result, the
trapdoor knapsack A can be solved in time O((2 f )N), here
N = n ∗ 1/ f .
e.g. Let, length(X)=96 and xi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 255}, then
N=12. However, the time taken for searching solution
exhaustively=O((28)12).
From Case-I and Case-II, it is clear that
O(296)=O((28)12)
=O(25612)
In general: O(2n) = O(256N).
where N=n/8, i.e. the reduction in number of elements by 1/8
allowing the hike in speed by 8.
4. Conclusion
The author of [1] has defined a “super-increasing vector
level 2” as V ′ = (v1, v1, ..., vn). If we keep the length of
publicized vector V and the vector X is the same, but, since
xi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 255}, such a knapsack cryptosystem is practically
not possible. In the knapsack cipher 0/255, the author has not
taken attention on the speed of cipher, that is very important
factor for secure communication. However, if the size of vector
V is reduced to a factor(1/f), then it results in a hike for speed
by a factor(f). An important fact is that even the transmission
speed will be improved, the efficiency of solving trapdoor knap-
sack remains the same. We would like to add some more facts
is that the first serious attack on the basic version of Merkle
and Hellman cryptosystem was mounted by shamir in 1984 [3]
by exploiting the special structure of the sequence of knapsack.
The basic tool for analysis was sawtooth curves (function of
Vai(mod m)). In which, accumulation points of the minima of
l sawtooth curves is found by dividing both coordinates of the
curve by modular m. In this way, we get the sawtooth curve
of the function of Vai(mod 1). Since, the function is now in-
dependent to m and 0 ≤ V < 1, the attack is applicable to any
knapsack cipher 0/2 f .
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